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Health Care Issues of the Iraq and Afghan Wars: 




Public information about the use of health care through the 
Veterans Health Administration (VHA) by veterans of the Iraq and 
Afghan wars (OIF/OEF) underscores the potential for 
overestimating the impact on the taxpayer.  Pressing needs of 
newly discharged veterans require immediate attention, 
especially for PTSD, TBI, and physical disability services, but 
the demand for immediate post-deployment VHA services is 
overshadowed nationally by the demands of the aging Korean and 
Vietnam War cohorts in terms of the number of patients and the 
total cost of their care.  In addition, the long-run care needs 
for aging OIF/OEF veterans will be significant. 
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US veterans, their families, Congress, and the public are 
concerned about the nation’s ability to provide medical care for 
members of the armed forces returning from active war duty in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, conflicts labeled “Operation Enduring 
Freedom” and “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” respectively (or 
OIF/OEF).1-4 News stories of injured OIF/OEF soldiers primarily 
focus on care for veterans with brain or spinal cord injuries, 
amputations, and mental disorders connected to military service, 
conditions that can be very costly to treat.  Returning veterans 
have sought care for a broad range of conditions, however, 
including all major diagnostic categories.5  
The rigors of combat deployment may result in a substantial 
increase in service-connected conditions that do not show up in 
casualty statistics.  Back strains and other muscle or skeletal 
problems may not have been reported in the conflict area, but 
may bring older reservists to the Veterans Health Administration 
(VHA) after separation from the military.  Similarly, veterans 
who have been away from family and friends for more than a year 
may have trouble adjusting to family life when they return.  
Readjustment reactions may not manifest in the deployment area 
and may not be disabling conditions, but may require 
psychological help when the military personnel become veterans. 
Conventional wisdom holds that care for returning veterans is 
placing a large burden on VHA, the part of the Department of 
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Veterans Affairs providing health care to veterans.6 This impact 
needs to be assessed in the context of the other demands on the 
VHA system, especially that from the Vietnam War cohort.  
Vietnam veterans are entering that period of life with the 
greatest health burden from chronic disease and old age.  In 
fact, demand for immediate post-deployment VHA services by 
OIF/OEF veterans is overshadowed nationally by the demands of 
the aging Korean and Vietnam War cohorts in terms of the number 
of patients and the cost of their care. 
Health care demands of recently discharged veterans are not 
spread equally across veterans, states, or VHA medical centers, 
however.  Some veterans have suffered tremendous physical and 
psychological traumas while others have experienced little or no 
trauma.  Some states are home to larger communities of veterans; 
some had more reservists and National Guard units called up and 
therefore have larger numbers of these veterans following their 
separation from military duty.  Differential impacts are 
especially likely for VHA medical centers that specialize in 
mental health services as well as for traumatic brain injury 
(TBI) or rehabilitation services throughout the system. 
This report of trends in the veteran population and costs of 
care supports a conclusion that the immediate medical needs 
engendered by OIF/OEF are the most important incremental health 
care cost of these wars.  As discharged military personnel age, 
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their health care costs will increasingly be for different types 
of services than the OIF/OEF veterans require today:  care for 
complex chronic conditions rather than for war injuries; for 
dementias rather than mental health disorders triggered by 
traumas.  A large portion of the long-run care for OIF/OEF 
veterans would have been required even if the nation had not 
gone to war, because the veterans could be expected to develop 
chronic conditions as they age, as the veterans of prior 
conflicts have done. 
In this paper, we place the OIF/OEF cohort in the context of 
all living US veterans in order to set the context of resource 
needs.  We then estimate the health care demands on VHA of 
veterans from this first decade of the twenty-first century in 
the absence of the OIF/OEF conflicts and examine the impact of 
OIF/OEF on the VHA, especially in the area of PTSD, TBI, and 
physical disability services.   
Study Data and Methods 
 Most of the data presented here is from reports, testimony 
and data that are publicly available through VHA or other 
federal websites or in the health care literature.  We focused 
on five critical components that would mark a departure from the 
steady state for veterans health care:  1) numbers of new 
veterans; 2) numbers of wounded veterans, particularly those 
with severe injuries; 3) proportions of new veterans with mental 
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health problems; 4) changes in veteran benefits; and 5) changes 
in new veterans’ use of health care services, especially those 
of the VHA. 
Through an unfunded project approved by the Institutional 
Review Boards at both NPS and VA Boston Healthcare System, we 
were also able to obtain counts of reservists, national guards 
and active duty military who were deployed since the end of 
2001.  These previously unpublished counts provide us with up to 
date estimates of the numbers of new veterans since the 
beginning of the OIF/OEF conflicts.   
The Veteran Population 
In 2001, the US veteran population was 26.1 million, the 
majority of whom were in their late 50s or older.7 Since then, 
the US has engaged in major military operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq, deploying 1.5 million troops during these conflicts as 
of spring, 2007.8  The number of total active duty personnel 
remains low compared to most of the past 70 years, however, at 
about 1.4 million a year compared to over 12 million in World 
War II and almost 4 million in the late 1960s.9 Growth in the 
total number of US veterans in the past 70 years followed the 
nation’s involvement in World War II, the Korean conflict and 
Vietnam (Exhibit 1).   
The total number of veterans peaked in the early 1980s.  
Since then the total has generally declined as many older 
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veterans have died and the military downsized as a result of the 
end of the Cold War.  Thus, the majority of veterans today 
served in the Vietnam War or earlier conflicts. Despite the 
deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq, the projected veteran 
population as of 9/2007 has decreased to 23.5 million with 
approximately 39% age 65 or older.8 
The number of veterans discharged since 2002 who served in 
OIF/OEF was over 850,000 by April of 2008, 49% of whom were 
reservists or national guard.6 Since 2002, the total number of 
veterans discharged is estimated at about 1.4 million, over 6.5% 
of all living veterans.  This total addition to the veteran 
population has only a marginal impact on the veteran 
demographics, however.  For example, even if all the new 
veterans were 22 years of age, they would drop the average 
veteran age by only about two years, from 60 to about 58. 
The importance of the veteran cohorts from prior conflicts 
is apparent from the distribution of the veteran population by 
age (Exhibit 2).   The healthcare needs of these older veterans 
are those of most middle-aged and elderly Americans with complex 
chronic conditions – e.g., diabetes plus chronic heart failure – 
with additional complications from disabilities sustained during 
military service, including mental health disorders.  These 
veterans will continue to comprise most of the demand on VHA 
funding and services in the near future until the majority of 
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the Korean War and Vietnam War cohorts pass through the system 
in about 2015. 
In the last century, the number of military personnel 
wounded in war has been far more numerous than deaths.  For 
example, the Congressional Budget Office reports that the number 
of troops wounded in action in OIF was seven times the number of 
deaths (as of January 2007). Table 1 details the US military 
deaths and casualties from principal wars since the Civil War.  
The table indicates an increasing ratio of wounded to dead over 
time.  Battlefield medicine, evacuation procedures, and battle 
field medical support services have evolved tremendously over 
time leading to greater survival rates for injured troops.  The 
greater proportion of wounded to dead for OIF/OEF can also be 
attributed to the use of body armor and helmets.  This 
protective gear shields the user from bullets and shrapnel, 
improving overall survival rates.   
Major casualties sustained in OIF/OEF can result in 
amputations and TBI.  The number of amputees is relatively low 
for OIF/OEF compared to other major conflicts (Table 2), but the 
percentage of the wounded who had amputations (at 1.5%) is close 
to that for the Vietnam conflict (at 1.7%).  These numbers do 
not distinguish loss of fingers and toes from loss of entire 
limbs, however. 
 10 
It is extremely difficult to obtain the number of veterans 
suffering from TBI, in part because some cases of closed brain 
injury may manifest later, even after separation from the 
military.  Nevertheless, TBI appears to account for a larger 
proportion of casualties among injured troops in OIF/OEF than in 
other wars.8 It is estimated that 14%-18% of the Vietnam War 
combat casualties (21,500 to 28,000 troops) suffered TBI, with 
or without another lethal wound.9  As a point of comparison, DoD 
reported a total of 5,503 TBI cases as of January, 2008 for 
OIF/OEF.10  However, researchers have reported much larger 
numbers of OIF/OEF veterans suffering from TBI, from 8,000 to 
almost 70,000.11  These larger numbers include estimates of 
veterans with mild or moderate TBI, which are more difficult to 
diagnose than the results of severe injuries. 
The vast difference in the estimates underscores the 
difficulty of obtaining reliable data for these injuries.  In 
addition, there is no single International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD 9) 
code for TBI.  The codes identify various types of injuries to 
the head distinguished, for the most part, by the section of the 
head injured rather than by the severity of the injury to the 
brain.  Various organizations and researchers use subsets of the 
codes.  Also, some estimates reported in peer reviewed journals 
are based on soldiers’ responses to screening questions from 
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post-deployment surveys and not actual diagnosis made by medical 
personnel.  Finally, many of those screened for TBI do not keep 
their follow up medical appointments or if they do keep the 
appointment may be ruled out for TBI. 
Findings from the National Vietnam Veterans’ Readjustment 
Study suggest 830,000 Vietnam veterans suffered symptoms 
associated with PTSD at the time of the study in 1983, about 9% 
of the troops serving during the era or approximately 26% of 
theater veterans.12  In the case of OIF/OEF, 15.6% to 17.1% of 
veterans deployed to Iraq reportedly displayed symptoms of PTSD 
and 11.2% of veterans deployed to Afghanistan reportedly did 
so.13   These percentages suggest that perhaps as many as 77,000 
to 120,000 of all active duty military who have separated from 
service since 2002 may have symptoms of PTSD.  In total, VHA 
reports that almost 40,000 OIF/OEF veterans who have accessed 
VHA heath care to date displayed symptoms of PTSD.2  
 
Veterans Health Care 
In 2001, 3.9 million veterans used VHA health care 
services.  Approximately half of this VHA patient population was 
65 years or older, about 5 years above the median age for the 
veteran population overall.  That year’s VHA medical care budget 
was $20.1 billion, an 11% increase from 1999.14 During this time, 
the number of patients treated annually increased by more than 
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11% primarily due to a major restructuring of the veterans’ 
health benefit in recognition that their medical care required 
more management of chronic conditions rather than acute 
hospitalization and its follow up care.15   
VHA medical care expenditures (almost $40 billion for 
fiscal year 2008)7 primarily represent the on-going costs to the 
nation of prior military engagements, not OIF/OEF.  For fiscal 
years 2005 and 2006, VHA funding required for the health care of 
returning OIF/OEF troops was highlighted in requests for 
supplemental appropriations.16,17The supplemental was $1.8 billion 
in 2007 and budget authority from emergency funds for FY 2008 is 
almost $3.7 billion.7 
OIF/OEF veterans who have left active duty are now eligible 
for at least five years of free VHA health care.18  Of these, the 
Congressional Budget Office reports that well over 225,000 have 
sought any care from VHA, representing at most about 5% of the 
current VHA annual patientload of about 5 million patients.1  
This count is cumulative, however.  In any one year, the number 
is considerable less.  In 2006, for example, it was 155,000.19 
The health problems of all OIF/OEF veterans who have 
received VHA care encompassed more than 7,990 diagnostic codes 
with the most common health problems being musculoskeletal 
(joint and back), mental, nervous system/sense organs, digestive 
system and “Symptoms, Signs and Ill-Defined Conditions.” 2 This 
 13 
last category is a catch all category that is commonly used for 
outpatient diagnosis.  It consists primarily of common symptoms 
that do not have an immediate obvious cause.   
A small proportion of the OIF/OEF patients require 
intensive surgical and/or rehabilitative care for severe 
injuries.  For example, as of January 2008, there were 1,031 
amputees and 5,503 patients with diagnosed TBI.20  VA has given 
preliminary mental health diagnoses to over 100,000 OIF/OEF 
veterans.  Of these, at least half are likely to be identified 
as suffering from PTSD.2  These chronic conditions can be costly 
to treat over a number of years.  However, a large proportion of 
the more than 225,000 patients who have used VA services may 
simply be availing themselves of their benefit that allows them 
free VHA services for the first five years post-discharge.  
There is no method of predicting if they will continue to be 
eligible for VHA services since future policies are uncertain 
but one can assume that, at a minimum, the current legislation 
and policies will remain in effect.21 
 The utilization and costs of VHA health care for the 
OIF/OEF patients have to be estimated in both short- and long-
run time frames.  In the short run, some OIF/OEF veterans 
require more intense acute or rehabilitative care.  In the long 
run, their care will require primarily the same types of 
services currently received by veterans of other conflicts.  
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 Expenditures for Signature Conditions of OIF/OEF 
In the short run, national policy changes concerning 
treatment for TBI, amputations, and PTSD are requiring major 
investments. VHA has considerable experience treating amputees, 
TBI and PTSD.  For example, between 1998 and 2000, VHA 
discharged 3,006 inpatients with TBI diagnoses.22 Evaluations of 
their VHA costs of care found ranges for the mild and moderate 
cases, primarily skull fractures, from $17,000 to $45,000, 
depending on whether the treatment center was in a teaching or 
non-teaching facility, with or without a dedicated TBI unit.  In 
general, teaching facilities were more costly, but dedicated 
units were less.  Severe cases of TBI from OIF/OEF should cost 
considerably more than this not only because of inflation since 
the late 1990s, but because these patients exhibit more symptoms 
of polytrauma, indicating more extensive physical damage and 
greater mental or emotional impacts.23 Further, extensive care 
for TBI patients can be required for several years at least as 
health problems stemming from the injuries persist. 
VHA has added four Polytrauma Rehabilitation Centers (in 
Tampa, Florida; Richmond, Virginia; Minneapolis, Minnesota; and, 
Palo Alto, California) and 17 Polytrauma Network Sites.  The 
latter have specific amputation, rehabilitation, and mental 
health expertise including:  Comprehensive Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation Service;  accredited Inpatient Rehabilitation 
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Unit; accredited Prosthetic/Orthotic Lab; certified prosthetist 
on staff; Surgical expertise in the area of amputation care and 
polytrauma; Specialized PTSD programming; Presence of Driver's 
Training Program; Access to tele-rehabilitation technology  
While this policy places interdisciplinary expertise within 
each of the VHA’s 21 geographic regions, many veterans will find 
the cost of travel to these centers to be prohibitive.  
Improving the standard of care at the other 150 of so medical 
centers and the more than 800 community outpatient clinics will 
help some disabled veterans living far from the special 
polytrauma programs.  In the past, veterans have relocated to be 
closer to the VHA health care they needed.  Some OIF/OEF 
veterans may also resort to this solution.  Establishing 
additional clinics or contracting with local providers are other 
ways to make services available, but there is a limit.  The 
requisite skills do not exist in all towns and in some states 
the veterans requiring those services are too sparsely located 
to assure the providers of a livelihood. 
The polytrauma investment was funded through a supplemental 
appropriation of about $1.8 billion in 2005-2006.  That 
appropriation was also intended to shorten veterans’ waiting 
times to see VHA providers.  One reason for this expansion of 
services is the potential for higher than average suicide rates 
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among returning veterans,24 which may be reduced if the veterans 
can access mental health care in a more timely way.   
Treatment for serious mental illness, such as PTSD, can 
vary from year to year for a given patient, but often requires 
multiple years of care.  Although no cost information is 
currently available for mental health services for OIF/OEF 
veterans, in 1999, the average total cost of care within VHA was 
$8,284 for patients with PTSD, about 70% above the overall 
average that year.25 Much of that additional cost is shown to be 
associated with the patients’ physical ailments, however.  For 
example, mental health disorders are implicated in long-run 
physical problems such as cardiac disease.26  By delivering care 
sooner to OIF/OEF veterans, the VHA might be able to reduce the 
development of co-morbid conditions. 
With respect to amputations, the mission of VHA and DoD 
collaboration is “to rehab our military amputee patients to the 
highest possible level of physical function so that the loss of 
a limb does not prevent them from returning to their military 
profession.”27 The technology now available to accomplish this 
mission is much more costly than prosthetic technology before 
these conflicts because the use of microprocessors gives a 
higher level of functioning.  For example, the “C-leg”, a 
titanium leg with a microprocessor in the knee, cost about 
$50,000 in 2003, without including the costs of related 
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rehabilitation care.28  Because VHA allows all veteran amputees 
to request and receive any prosthetic device, the impact of this 
DoD policy on the VHA budget is unknown.  The long-run costs are 
currently being evaluated by VHA researchers to evaluate costs 
over 5-, 10-, 20-year and lifetime time frames compared to two 
alternative types of prosthetics.29 
In the long run, care for the OIF/OEF veterans will require 
the same types of services currently received by veterans of 
other conflicts such as care for complex chronic conditions, 
diabetes, high blood pressure, pulmonary disease, heart failure, 
cancer.  Two differences arising from the conflicts may lead 
these veterans to rely more on publicly-funded programs such as 
VA and Medicare for this future care.  First, greater burdens of 
disability may limit the veterans’ return to employment and 
ability to access private sector health insurance.  Second, 
receiving care in VA in the early years after separation from 
the military may lead them to be more accustomed to this source 
of care compared to earlier cohorts. 
The current veteran population is estimated at about 25 
million with more than 5 million accessing VHA health care in a 
given year.  The veteran population is projected to steadily 
decrease to under 15 million by 2033.  There are no projections 
as to who will be accessing VHA health care at that time, 
however.   
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Conclusions 
In the short term, the higher-than-expected demand for VHA 
services from returning OIF/OEF military personnel requires 
additional resources for amputees, traumatic brain injury 
centers and psychiatric care.  In addition, VHA provides care 
(primarily in outpatient clinics) for relatively healthy 
veterans who seek health care within five years after discharge 
from the service.  To keep these demands from competing with and 
displacing those of older veterans, the nation is investing in 
resources for treatment of blast injuries, amputations, and 
PTSD, recognizing that these commitments will have to be 
sustained as this veteran cohort ages. 
The cost to the nation of health care for OIF/OEF veterans 
depends on 4 factors:  1) How many additional veterans were 
created because of the conflicts, above and beyond the flow of 
discharges that would have existed in the absence of the wars; 
2) How many additional veterans use VHA services compared to the 
number who would have been expected to use VHA;  3) The 
intensity of their use of health care; and  4) The pattern or 
cycle of care for their condition.   
First, OIF/OEF has probably increased the number of newly 
separated veterans by calling up National Guard and Reservists.  
The flow of discharges from the Active Duty forces has remained 
fairly constant since 2002, but over half of all separations in 
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the OIF/OEF cohort were Guards and Reservists.  Of course, some 
members of the Guard and the Reserves were already veterans, so 
the exact number of new veterans requires DoD estimation.  If 
half of the 600,000 to 700,000 separations were members of the 
Guard or the Reserves2 and half of them had not been active 
military before OIF/OEF, then the number of new veterans 
attributable to OIF/OEF might be about 150,000 veterans, an 
increase of less than 1% of the total veteran population. 
Second, VHA would have expected some number of newly 
discharged veterans to have sought care from its medical centers 
and outpatient clinics.  In any of the most current years, about 
20% of veterans are younger than 50, of whom about 15% (1 
million/6.8 million) use VHA in any year.  Since the most recent 
discharges fall primarily into the younger age brackets, their 
expected use of VHA should have been expected to be non-zero, 
but less than 15%.  This predicted utilization implies that the 
increased proportion of these new veterans with any VHA use was 
at most 18 percentage points – from 15% (or less) to the 33% 
reported.  This increased proportion translates into at least 
120,000 additional veterans demanding VHA care (20% of 600,000 
OIF/OEF veterans as of the end of 2006).  This number is less 
than the additional Guards and Reservists who qualified for VHA 
care through OIF/OEF, however. 
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What is the intensity of services that OIF/OEF veterans 
receive from VHA?  The average expenditure per patient in the 
past 3 years has been just under $6,000 across all VHA patients, 
95% of whom are veterans of earlier wars.  VHA reports that the 
average expenditure for OIF/OEF veterans using VHA services is 
less than $3,000 per year.  This lower average suggests a much 
lower intensity of services for most OIF/OEF patients.   
The most critically injured OIF/OEF veterans (those with 
severe TBI, amputations, severe PTSD) require much more than 
this $3,000 average, at least initially.  The numbers of these 
more costly patients is also unknown.  As of May 30, 2007, there 
were 12,279 servicemen and women who were wounded in action and 
did not return to duty within 72 hours.  This number is an upper 
bound on the number of critically injured OIF/OEF veterans as of 
that date.  In addition, estimates put 11-17% of all other 
discharges (77,000-120,000) as potentially diagnosed with PTSD.  
These two groups lead to an upper estimate of about 90,000-
133,000 veterans with war-related health care needs that are 
well about the average.      
In the long run, many of the less critically ill OIF/OEF 
veterans who have been VHA patients at some time in 2002-2007 
will not continue to use VHA.  Most of these veterans are still 
young and relatively healthy.  They will get jobs, have health 
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insurance coverage and be relatively indistinguishable from 
other Americans in terms of their health care needs.  
Thus, the pressing needs of newly discharged veterans 
require immediate attention, especially in the area of TBI, 
PTSD, and physical disability services, but nationally the needs 
of the aging Korean and Vietnam War cohorts remain far greater 
in terms of the number of patients and the average cost of their 
care. The major demand on VHA services continues to be from the 
aging veterans.  It is hard to predict the demand for VA 
services from this cohort since it is unclear if the veterans 
are eligible for care from other programs and if they will 
choose VA care.   
Eventually, the aging OIF/OEF cohort will also require 
services for more chronic conditions.  Whether they turn to VHA 
will depend in part on the nature of their disabilities and 
their economic situation.  Like the majority of veterans today, 
they may choose other sources of care.  Decisions about VA 
capacity, quality, eligibility, costs, and co-payments will be 
major drivers of future demand for VA health care.  These 
factors may be more important than combat experience in 
determining the amount of care OIF/OEF veterans seek from VA. 
Current attempts to estimate the additional care for the 
OIF/OEF cohort over this longer run overstate the amounts 
because they do not recognize the incremental nature of these 
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demands. In addition, estimates must take into account that the 
heavy resource use for those with war-related conditions will 
decline, on average, until the cohort ages and develops more 
chronic medical conditions. 
Finally, the demands for additional services are spread 
across the country and not necessarily concentrated near VHA 
medical centers or clinics.  In the past, the veteran population 
has adjusted around existing VHA facilities.  Relocation is a 
reality facing many returning veterans and will need to be 
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